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Abstract
This paper tackles the issue of the optimality of agglomeration in a 
two-region economy with skilled/mobile and unskilled/immobile workers. 
The market leads to the optimal outcome when transport costs are high 
or low. However, for intermediate values, it yields agglomeration whereas 
dispersion is socially desirable. We show that competitive lobbying on 
factor mobility by the two groups of workers sustains the second best 
optimum.
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One of the most severe challenges posed by the ongoing integration of national 
economies within the European Union is the strengthening of the core regions 
accommodating modern production sectors at the expense of the peripheral 
regions retaining only traditional and local activities (Ottaviano and Puga, 
1998). In the First Report on Economic and Social Cohesion, the European 
Commission observes that “ [t]he average disparity in income per head in the 
EU is twice that in comparable regions in the US” , while “[ejconomic activity is 
strongly concentrated in the most urbanised areas of the Community. Regions 
with more than 500 inhabitants per square kilometers account for only 4% of 
the land area of the Union but for more than half the population. This implies 
that between two thirds and three quarters of the EU’s total wealth creation 
occurs in urban areas” (p.24).
Although Sala-i-Martin (1996) has found slow interregional convergence 
from 1950 to 1990, it is more and more widely accepted that regional disparities 
have been growing within the EU since the deepening of the integration process 
started in the 1980s (Amstrong and Vickerman, 1995; Neven and Goyette, 
1995; Magrini, 1999). Furthermore, even slow convergence between countries 
may well hide a process of regional divergence inside each country as argued 
by de la Fuente and Vives (1995) who show that about half of the income 
inequality across EU regions corresponds to differences within each member 
state. Taking a different angle and comparing the spatial distributions of 
activities in various sectors between 1968 and 1990, Amiti (1998) notes both 
an increase in the geographical concentration of economic activities within 
most EU state members and, for a vast majority of sectors, a tendency toward 
more agglomeration within the EU as a whole.1
This lack of cohesion in social development and economic growth has 
led the European Commission to pay more attention to this issue at the time 
of the Single European Act (SEA). The reform of the Structural Funds and 
the creation of the Cohesion Funds, both aiming partially at the reduction of
'Comparing the relative importance of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory to that o f economic 
geography, Davis and Weinstein (1999) observe that the latter provides a much better expla­
nation of the spatial distribution of economic activity within a country such as Japan. To the 
extent that the EU is getting more and more integrated, the scenario of the core-periphery 




























































































regional disparities, have been the concretization of this awareness. For the 
period 1994-1999, these funds correspond to approximately one third of the 
EU budget, thus showing the growing importance that the ‘regional question’ 
plays for the European construction. For the European Commission (1996. 
P-13):
“Imbalances do not just imply a poorer quality of life for the most 
disadvantaged regions and the lack of life-chances open to their citizens, 
but indicate an under-utilisation of human potential and the failure to 
take advantage of economic opportunities which could benefit the Union 
as a whole.”
The statement is clear-cut and reveals that the concern of the Commis­
sion is twofold. On the one side it is about equity ( “... a poorer quality of life 
for the most disadvantaged regions and the lack of life-chances open to their 
citizens On the other it is also about efficiency ( “... an under-utilization 
of human potential and the failure to take advantage of economic opportuni­
ties which could benefit the Union as a whole...” ). However, while the equity 
implications of regional imbalances are self-evident, the self-confidence of the 
statement about efficiency is puzzling. The reason why is the shortage of 
theoretical arguments on the emergence, not to say on the welfare impact, of 
regional imbalances that might support the Commission’s view.
Indeed, if anything, conventional wisdom supports the opposing view, 
according to which the concentration of means within the most productive 
regions is often the optimal strategy to maximize global income (Rahman, 
1963; Takayama, 1967). Accounting for regional disparities mitigates such rec­
ommendation but does not upset them: important discrepancies are usually 
required between the beginning and the end of the planning period because it 
is desirable in the meantime to invest into the most efficient regions (Michel 
et al., 1983). Thus, conventional wisdom seems to accept the existence of an 
inherent trade-off between regional equity and efficiency (Martin, 1998).
This paper has two objectives. The first is to investigate the conditions 
under which, as the Commission sustains, the equity-efficiency trade-off does 
not exist, i.e. agglomeration is indeed socially undesirable. In doing so, we are 
forced to depart from the neoclassical world of non-increasing returns to scale 
and perfect competition where economic integration has no dramatic effects on 




























































































not amplified and eventually disappear. Instead, we build on some recent de­
velopments of economic geography that study the impact of frictions to goods 
and factors mobility on the location of imperfectly competitive industries in the 
presence of increasing returns to scale (Fujita et ai, 1999; Fujita and Thisse, 
1996; Ottaviano and Puga, 1998). In particular, we rely on Krugman’s (1991) 
classical model as modified by Ottaviano and Thisse (1998) who propose the 
adoption of an alternative demand system that, contrary to the original one, 
is amenable to analytical solutions and proper welfare comparisons.2
In Krugman’s set-up there are two regions, two sectors and two specific 
factors. The traditional sector employs unskilled workers to produce a homo­
geneous good which is perfectly competitive and freely traded. The modern 
sector employs skilled workers to supply a differentiated good which is mo­
nopolistically competitive and costly traded. In accordance with the empirical 
evidence (see, e.g., Shields and Shields, 1989), unskilled workers are assumed 
to be much less mobile than skilled ones. One may wonder if the assumption 
of mobility of the skilled is reasonable in an area where linguistic and cultural 
barriers have often be considered as a major impediments to mobility. Some 
transformations are taking place within the Elf that make this assumption 
more plausible that it might seem at first sight. First, English becomes the 
lingua franca of the business and scientific communities as well as that of 
most international institutions. Second, the construction of a High Speed Rail 
connecting the main conurbations of the Union (such as the TGV) seems to 
enhance the mobility of the skilled. Although it is premature to conclude, it is 
worth mentioning that, since the Channel Tunnel has been built, the City of 
London has already attracted a fairly large number of French financial opera­
tors who used to work in Paris. To be sure, services account for a substantial 
share of the modern sector and many services are produced where they are 
consumed. However, it is reasonable to expect high-level services’ workers to 
be mobile, thus making likely their agglomeration in a few large metropolitan 
regions.
Having said that, the core-periphery model reveals that for low transport 
costs (broadly defined to encompass any impediment to trade) skilled labor 
mobility causes the modern sector to cluster in one region because the posi-
2Most o f the models surveyed in Fujita et al. (1999) and Ottaviano and Puga (1998) are 
based on a nested-CES demand system which is not really suited to address the question of 
the efficiency of economic agglomeration because the marginal utility o f the numéraire is not 




























































































tive aggregate demand effect of skilled workers’ immigration on profits more 
than offsets the negative competition effect of modern firms’ inflow. Though 
path-breaking, Krugman’s seminal contribution falls short of providing any 
welfare evaluation of the implied pattern of regional specialization. This is 
our first aim: we want to determine whether or not the spatial concentration 
of the modern sector is socially desirable and to assess its pros and cons by 
disentangling the various external effects which cause its emergence.
Previewing our results, we begin by pointing out that the market out­
come is socially desirable when transport costs are either high or low. While 
in the former case activities are dispersed, in the latter they are agglomerated. 
By contrast, for intermediate values of these costs, the marklet leads to the 
agglomeration of the modem sector whereas it is socially optimal to keep it 
geographically dispersed. In this case, in which the equity-efficiency trade-off 
disappears, we recognize the scenario envisioned by the European Commission. 
This is an interesting finding in that low transport costs may be viewed as cor­
responding to shipping costs between small-sized regions, whereas large costs 
would instead be the counterpart of trade costs between large trading blocks. 
Intermediate values would therefore correspond to shipping costs between re­
gions belonging to medium-sized areas such as the EU. This interpretation 
would suggest that there could well be too much geographical concentration 
within the EU after the effects of the Single Market were completed (Martin, 
1999). If so, our finding would provide an efficiency-grounded case for an 
active regional policy at the level of the European Union.
Once we have established the suboptimality of the market-delivered eco­
nomic landscape, we can move on towards our second objective, that is to 
understand whether the actual mechanics of European policy making has any 
chance of delivering the economically efficient outcome. In principle, the effec­
tiveness of the Commission is hampered by at least two crucial problems. First, 
the costs of an inefficient economic landscape are likely to be unevenly distrib­
uted among different interest groups so that any active regional intervention is 
bound to generate a conflict between opposite interests (Mazey and Mitchell, 
1993). Second, effective intervention requires enormous information-gathering 
capabilities that, due its relatively small bureaucracy, the Commission is un­
likely to possess (Gorges, 1996). This second aspect appears even more severe 
if one considers that, even though sometimes (under the ‘assent’ and ‘cooper­




























































































the Commission is an unelected body and thus it receives no direct feed-back 
from any electorate (Mazey and Richardson, 1993). Both problems have led 
the Commission to adopt the role of an intermediator between conflicting in­
terests that are thus urged to get organized as pressure groups in order to 
improve the transmission of information about their collective needs (Gorges, 
1996). In 1993 as many as 525 interests groups were officially recognized and 
regularly consulted by the Commission (Mazey and Richardson, 1993) while 
the current estimate of people involved in interest representation in Brussels 
is close to 13,000 (The Economist, 1998).
Our model lends itself quite naturally to studying the political economy 
of the distributive effects generated by the formation and the development 
of a core region. Specifically, it can be used to show that the population of 
unskilled workers is always negatively affected by the emergence of a core­
periphery structure because their access to the output of the modern sector 
becomes too costly. In other words, members of the traditional sector oppose 
the deepening of the European unification process. By contrast, the skilled 
workers may be either better off or worse off when they are agglomerated, 
because each mover does not internalize the external effects that her move im­
poses on all other skilled. More precisely, when the number of skilled workers 
is sufficiently low (large), moving toward the large region may be individu­
ally rational (irrational) but collectively irrational (rational) from the mobile 
workers’ point of view. In this case, both groups of workers are against the 
deepening of the unification process. However, when the population of skilled 
workers is large enough, the two groups have conflicting interests because the 
skilled now gain from being clustered within the same region. This conflict 
gives rise to the emergence of competing interest groups.
Anticipating our results, by building on the literature on informational 
lobbying (Potters and van Linden, 1992; Austen-Smith, 1993) and on the the­
ory of menu auctions (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986), we are able to show 
that, first, lobbying by conflicting pressure groups for or against the mobility 
of the skilled workers allows the Commission to implement the second best op­
timum economic landscape and, second, the actual coalitions of interests that 
are formed are immaterial for the attainment of efficiency since their compo­
sition has only redistributive implications. These results holds if lobbying is 
‘competitive’ in the sense that all interests have free access to the Commis­




























































































acts as a mediating organization (‘honest broker’ ). This provides a useful 
benchmark for political conduct. It implies that, for implementing efficient 
regional policies, the Commission has to lend a candid hear to all interests as 
well as to promote their participation to the lobbying process with particular 
emphasis on those interests that, because they are diffuse, face larger costs of 
collective action (Olson, 1980). Under this respect, our results provide some 
rationale to the extension of qualified majority voting by the SEA, which in 
1992 substituted the national veto power with qualified majority voting on 
measures necessary to complete the internal market and to new policy sec­
tors (R&D, health and safety, environment). This has increased “the appeal 
of, and the need for, rapid transnational interest definition, aggregation, and 
coordination” (Gorges, 1996), thus favoring the coalition of diffuse Euro-wide 
interests.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section 
presents a simple model yielding a core-periphery structure when transport 
costs are low. Section 3 identifies the conditions under which the geographical 
agglomeration of skilled workers is a market equilibrium, the first best opti­
mum or a second best optimum in which firms must break even. Section 4 
deals with the welfare of skilled and unskilled workers. Section 5 discusses the 
desirability of agglomeration from the social point of view as well as from the 
standpoint of each group of workers. Section 6 analyzes the lobbying game 
involving the groups of skilled and unskilled workers. Section 7 concludes.
2 A simple model of agglomeration
Consider a spatial economy formed by two sectors, M  and T, two regions, H 
and F, and two production factors, L and A, the first being (perfectly) mobile 
and the second immobile. Although other interpretations are possible, it is 
convenient to think of the mobile factor as skilled workers and the immobile 
one as unskilled workers. Indeed, empirical studies suggest that the skilled are 
more mobile than the unskilled (e.g. Shields and Shields, 1989, pp. 279, 285 
and 287), maybe because education generates human capital which is easily 
transferable to another region and eases the search for job, residency and a 




























































































and operates under monopolistic competition.3 The corresponding output is 
horizontally differentiated. There is a continuum of firms whose number N is 
determined under free entry. Each firm produces a single variety by means 
of a fixed amount <j> of skilled labor L. The traditional sector T  produces a 
homogeneous good under constant returns to scale, using unskilled labor A 
as the only input: one unit of A is required to produce one unit of output. 
This good is freely traded and is chosen as the numéraire. The varieties of 
the modern sector are traded at a cost of r  units of the numéraire per unit 
shipped between the two regions. The economy is endowed with A units of 
unskilled who are equally split between regions, and with L units of skilled 
whose fraction 0 < A < 1 is located in region H.
Preferences are identical across individuals and described by the follow­
ing quasi-linear indirect utility function which is symmetric in all varieties:
r N  l x  r M rN
v(y\p(i),i 6 [0,N]) =  -aJ^ p{i)di +  — -— Ĵ  \p(i)]2di (1)
rN rN
- c  /  p(i)p(j)didj + y + %
Jo Jo
where p(i) is the price of variety i 6 [0, TV], y the consumer labor income, and 
q0 her initial endowment in the numéraire. The parameters in (1) are such 
that a > 0 and b > c > 0. In this expression, a is a measure of the size of 
the market (since it expresses the intensity of preferences for the differentiated 
product), whereas a large value for b means that the representative consumer 
is biased toward a dispersed consumption of varieties, thus reflecting a love for 
variety.4 For a given value of 6, the parameter c expresses the substitutability 
between varieties: the higher c, the closer substitutes the varieties. Finally, 
we assume that the initial endowment %  in the numéraire is large enough 
for the consumption of the numéraire to be strictly positive at the market 
equilibrium and optimal solutions. Throughout the paper, we will encounter 
several conditions involving the various parameters of the model. In particular, 
we will assume that the least demanding condition regarding trade costs and
3Unlike most of the existing literature on economic geography, we do not use here the 
Dixit-Stiglitz model but another one whose details may be found in Ottaviano and Thisse 
(1999).
4 The direct utility behind (1) is the standard quadratic utility yielding linear demand 




























































































preference parameters, that is,
t  <  a/b (2)
is always satisfied. This condition is necessary for any single firm to find it 
profitable to sell in the foreign market, regardless of whom pays for the trade 
costs.
Labor market clearing implies that the number rt// of firms belonging 
to the modern sector and located in region H is equal to:
nH =  XL/4> (3)
so that the number of firms in F  is
nF =  ( l -  \)L/4>. (4)
Consequently, the total number of firms (varieties) in the economy is fixed and 
equal to N — L/<t>.
Entry and exit are free so that profits are zero in equilibrium. Hence, 
(3) and (4) imply that any change in the population of workers located in 
one region must be accompanied by a corresponding change in the mass of 
firms. By (3) and (4), the demand and supply of workers in each region are 
equal. As a result, the corresponding equilibrium wages are determined by 
a bidding process among firms which ends when no firm can earn a strictly 
positive profit at the equilibrium market prices.
By assumption, firms compete in segmented markets. Indeed, even 
within a unified economic area, there are many good reasons to believe that 
firms will succeed to segment markets (Horn and Shy, 1996). Even today, 
empirical work such as Head and Mayer (1998) shows that the EU is still very 
segmented. In the sequel, we focus on region H . Things pertaining to region 
F  can be derived by symmetry. Using the assumption of symmetry between 
varieties and Roy’s identity, individual demands for a representative firm in 
H are given by:
Qhh =  a -  (b+  cN) p „n  +  cP „  (5)
and
Qhf =  a ~  (b +  cN )pHF +  cPF (6)
where




























































































Pp =  Tltf PH F +  nF PFF
Clearly, Ph /N and Pf /N can be interpreted as the price indexes prevailing 
in region H and F.
A representative firm in H maximizes its profits defined by:
n «  = phh [a -  ( b + cN )phh  +  cPH] [A/2 +  XL] +  '
(.PH F -  t ) [a -  (6 +  cN )ph f  +  cPf ) [A/ 2 +  (1 -  A)L] -  <pwH
where A / 2 stands for the unskilled’s population in each region.
Market prices are obtained by maximizing profits while wages are deter­
mined as described above by equating the resulting profits to zero. Since we 
have a continuum of firms, each one is negligible in the sense that its action 
has no impact on the market. Hence, when choosing its prices, a firm in H 
accurately neglects the impact of its decision over the two price indices Pn 
and Pf ■ In addition, because firms sell differentiated varieties, each one has 
some monopoly power in that it faces a demand function with finite elasticity. 
On the other hand, since the price index enters the demand function as an 
additive term (see (5) and (6)), a firm must account for the distribution of the 
firms’ prices through some aggregate statistics, given here by the average mar­
ket price, in order to find its equilibrium price. As a consequence, our market 
solution is given by a Nash equilibrium with a continuum of players in which 
prices are interdependent: each firm neglects its impact on the market but is 
aware that the market as a whole has a non-negligible impact on its behavior.
Since profit functions are concave in own price, solving the first order 
conditions for profit maximization with respect to prices yields the equilibrium 
prices:
1 2a +  tcN( 1 — A) (7)P,,H ~ 2 2b +  cN
1 2a 4- rcNX
(8)PFF~ 2  2b + cN
T
PHF =  PFF +  X (9)
T
PFH =  PHH +  ^ ( 10)
Thus, the equilibrium prices under monopolistic competition depend on
the total number of active firms as well as on their distribution between the 




























































































leads to lower market prices for the same spatial distribution (A. 1 — A) because 
there is more competition in each regional market. Similarly, both the prices 
charged by local and foreign firms fall when the mass of local firms increases 
because competition is fiercer. Equilibrium prices also rise when the size of 
the local market, evaluated by a, gets larger or when the degree of product 
differentiation, inversely measured by c, increases provided that (2) holds. All 
these results agree with what is known in industrial organization and spatial 
pricing theory (Tirole, 1988, ch.7).
Substracting r from (9) and (10), we see that firms’ prices net of trade 
costs are positive regardless of the workers’ distribution if and only if
T < Ttrade
2 a(j>
2b(p +  cL ( i d
The same condition must hold for consumers in F (H) to buy from firms in H 
(F ), i.e. for the demand (6) evaluated at the prices (7) and (8) to be positive 
for all A. Clearly (11) is more restrictive than (2). From now on, condition 
(11) is assumed to hold. Consequently, we consider a setting in which there is 
a priori intra-industry trade and reciprocal dumping.
Finally, local sales rise with r  because of the higher protection enjoyed 
by the local firms but exports fall for the same reason. It is easy to check that 
the equilibrium operating profits earned by a firm established in H on each 
separated market are as follows:
n HH =  (6 +  cN) P2HH (A/2 +  XN<t>)
where Whh denotes the profits earned in H while the profits made from selling 
in F are
n WF = (6 + cN) (phf  -  T)2 \A/2 + (1 -  A)JV0]
Increasing A has two opposite effects on IIh h - First, the equilibrium 
price (7) falls as well as the quantity of each variety bought by each consumer 
living in region H . However, the total population of consumers residing in 
this region is now larger so that the profits made by a firm located in H on 
local sales may increase. What is at work here is a positive demand effect due 
to the increase in the local population that may compensate firms for both 
the adverse price effect and the reduction in individual demand due to the 




























































































The individual consumer surplus Sh in region H associated with the 
equilibrium prices (7) and (10) is then as follows (a symmetric expression 
holds in region F):
h 4. c  M
Sh =  —a[A phh +  (1 ~ A) Pfh ]N ■+------^ Phh  +  (1 — ^) Pfh ] N
-c[A  phh +  (1 -  A) pfh )2-/V2
3 Equilibrium and optimum spatial configurations
3.1 T h e  m arket o u tco m e
We now ask whether for a given spatial distribution of skilled workers, (A, 1 — 
A), there is an incentive for them to migrate and, if so, what direction the 
flow of migrants will take. Following the tradition of economic geography, 
we assume that skilled workers care only about their current utility levels.5 
Accordingly, if they observe that a location offers a higher indirect utility 
than the other, they want to move to that location. When moving, workers 
anticipate that ‘some’ firms will follow them. More precisely, the number of 
firms that relocate must be such that (3) and (4) remain valid for the new 
distribution of workers; wages are adjusted in each region for each firm to 
earn zero profits everywhere. Consequently, the driving force in the migration 
process is workers’ indirect utility differential between H and F, denoted
A F  = Vh — Vf =  Sh ~ Sp + wh — uif
=  Sh  -  Sf  + (H h h  +  ^ h f )/<I> ~ ( ^ f f  +  ^ f h )/<I>
so that the equation of motion is:
A= dX/dt =  AV  - A • (1 — A)
If A F  is positive, the skilled will move from F to H\ if it is negative, they will 
go in opposite direction.
A spatial equilibrium arises when A= 0. This happens at A € (0,1) 
when AV(A) =  0 in which case we have a dispersed configuration. Motion also
sNotice, however, that this approach leads to a fairly good approximation o f forward- 
looking behavior whenever skilled workers discount the future heavily and/or their migration 




























































































stops at endpoints A =  0 when AK(0) < 0 or at A =  1 when AV(1) > 0 in 
which case we have an agglomerated configuration. Therefore, the agglomer­
ated configuration is always stable when it is an equilibrium while the dispersed 
configuration is stable when the slope of Ah' (A) is negative.
The following comments are in order about the dynamics of migration 
of both consumers and firms. The immobility of the unskilled is a centrifugal 
force, at least as long as there is trade in the differentiated product between 
the two regions. The centripetal force is more elaborated. If an increasing 
number of firms are located in region H , there are two effects at work. First, 
more varieties are locally available (variety effect). Second, (7) and (10) imply 
that the equilibrium prices of all varieties sold in H are lower (competition 
effect). Both effects generate a higher indirect utility. This in turn induces 
some consumers to migrate toward this region. The resulting increase in the 
number of consumers creates a larger demand for the output of the modern 
sector in region H (demand effect), which therefore leads more firms to locate 
there.
The indirect utility differential is obtained by plugging the equilibrium 
prices (7)-(10) and, using (3) and (4), the equilibrium wages for the workers 
into (1):
( . 2)
- t [c2AL + \bc<t>L +  2bcfiA +  6&V -  c2L2]}
It follows immediately from this expression that A =  1/2 is always a spa­
tial equilibrium. The stability analysis of this equilibrium is easy to perform. 
Since (12) is linear in A, the critical value of r below which symmetry is no 
longer stable and the value below which agglomeration is stable are identical. 
For A ^  1/2, the indirect utility differential has always the same sign as 2A — 1 
if and only if the curly bracketed term is positive, a condition which holds if 
and only if:
12 a<t>(b(j> +  cL)
c2AL +  4bc<pL + 2bc<pA -I- 6b2<p2 -  c2L2
(13)
For the analysis to be meaningful, we need 0 < r M < Tirade- Otherwise 
trade would always imply agglomeration. Indeed, A V  is then a convex function 




























































































r  =  0, thus implying that the coefficient of 2A — 1 in (12) is always positive 
for all admissible values of r. Competition among local firms is very weak and 
the demand effect is always strong enough to yield agglomeration.
The inequality 0 < < Ttrad, holds if, and only if,
, .  7cL(cL +  260) +  66202
A > --------c(260 + cL)-------- (14)
which is satisfied when varieties are not too differentiated (c large), increasing 
returns in the modern sector are not too large (0 small), and/or the population 
of unskilled in the global economy is sufficiently large (/I large). We will 
assume throughout the rest of the paper that (14) holds.
When r  < t m , the symmetric spatial equilibrium is unstable and work­
ers agglomerate in region H (F ) provided that the initial fraction of skilled 
workers residing in this region exceeds 1/2. In other words, insofar as (14) is 
satisfied, agglomeration arises when trade is not too costly (r  small), varieties 
are very differentiated (c small) and/or when increasing returns in the mod­
ern sector are strong (0 large). When this is not the case, all activities are 
dispersed because the symmetric configuration is the only stable equilibrium.
P roposition  1 Assume that r  < T(ro(je and that ( I f )  holds. Then, if r  > r M 
the symmetric configuration is the only stable equilibrium with trade;'if r < r M 
there are two stable equilibria corresponding to the agglomerated configurations 
with trade; if r =  r Af there is a continuum of equilibria.
The nature of trade varies with the type of configuration emerging in 
equilibrium. In the dispersed configuration, there is only intra-industry trade 
in the modern sector; in the agglomerated equilibrium, trade is only inter­
industry: the core region only imports the output of the traditional sector 
from the peripheral region which only imports the output of the modern sector 
from the core region.
3.2 A  geom etrica l p r o o f
The best way to convey the economic intuition behind this result is probably 




























































































demand in region H for a typical local variety after choosing, for simplicity, 
the units of L so that b +  cN  =  1:
Phh =  a +  cPH{nHlT) -  —- —  (15)
A /1  +  o n \ i
where Qhh is the aggregate local demand of a firm located in H and, because 
Pfh > PHH and the total number of firms is fixed by skilled labor market 
clearing, the price index P/y is a decreasing function of uh at a rate which 
increases with r:




> 0 ( 16)
The horizontal and vertical intercepts of (15) are respectively [a+cPn(nn, r)] 
times [A/2 +  tfmyy] and |a +  cPyy(n/y, r)). The equilibrium values of Qhh and 
Phh are shown as Q Hh aRd Ph h ■ They are found by setting marginal rev­
enue equal to marginal cost. The operating profits are shown by the shaded 
rectangle and accrue to the skilled workers while, as usual, the above triangle 
represents the consumer surplus enjoyed by both skilled and unskilled workers.
The picture is a powerful learning device to understand the forces at 
work in the model. To see why, start from an initial situation where regions 
are identical (n/y =  rip). Suppose that some firms move from the foreign to 
the home region so that rip rises and np falls. For these firms to want to stay 
in the home region, operating profits have to increase. Indeed, were this not 
the case, the firms would rather go back to the foreign region.
Consider Figure 1. An increase in n/y has two opposite effects on op­
erating profits. First, as new firms enter the home region, the price index 
P/y(n/y, t ) decreases. Ceteris paribus, this would shift the inverse demand 
(15) toward the origin of the axes and operating profits would shrink. This 
effect is due to increased competition in the home market and stems from the 
fact that fewer firms now face trade costs when supplying the home market.
But this negative competition effect is not the only effect. For some firms to 
move to the home region, some skilled workers have to follow (nyy =  AL/<j>). 
This means that, as n/y increases, also A goes up so that the market of the 
home region expands. Ceteris paribus, the horizontal intercept of the inverse 
demand would move away from the origin and profits would expand. This is a 
positive demand effect which is induced by the linkage between the locations 




























































































Since the two effects oppose each other, the net result is a priori am­
biguous. But we can say more than that. In particular, we can assess which 
effect prevails depending on parameter values. Start with the competition ef­
fect that goes through [a +  cP n(nn ,r)]. This effect is strong if c is large, i.e. 
if varieties are good substitutes. It is also strong if \dPn(nn, r)/dnn\ is large. 
As shown in (16), this happens if r is large, because, when obstacles to trade 
are high, competition from the other region is weak and home firms care a lot 
about their competitors being close rather than distant. As to the demand 
effect, it will be strong if <p is large because each new firm brings along many 
skilled workers, and if A is small because immigrants have a large impact on 
the local market size.
We can therefore conclude that the demand effect dominates the compe­
tition effect, when goods are bad substitutes (c small), increasing returns are 
intense (0 large), the unskilled workers are unimportant (A small) and trade 
costs are low (r small). Under such circumstances, the entry of new firms 
in one region would raise the operating profits of all firms. Higher profits 
would attract more firms, generating circular causation among firms location 
decision. Agglomeration would then be sustainable as a spatial equilibrium.6
3.3 E fficien cy : th e  first b est ou tcom e
We assume that the planner is able (i) to assign any number of skilled workers 
(or, equivalently, of firms belonging to the modern sector) to a specific region 
and (ii) to use lump sum transfers from all workers to pay for the loss firms 
incur while pricing at marginal cost. The skilled have to work in order to have 
access to the output of the modern sector. The planner chooses A in order to 
maximize the following social welfare function (recall that individual utilities 
are quasi-linear):
W  =  —-Sh +  A L(Sh +  vjh) +  — Sp +  (1 — A )L(Sp + wp) (17)
6More rigorously, this argument establishes a sufficient condition for agglomeration. Be- 
cause skilled firms and workers have to move together, in order to obtain a necessary condi­
tion, one should also consider the impact of firms’ delocation on consumer surplus. Indeed, 
it is perfectly conceivable that the variety effect may sustain agglomeration even when the 




























































































which, up to an additive constant, is simply the sum of all workers’ indirect 
utilities and where all prices have been set equal to marginal cost:
Phh - Pff  =  0 and ph f  =  Pfh  =  r
Hence (17) becomes:
IV =  -^-h>\\L(—2a.<t> +  rb<j> +  tcA)A2 — 4L(—2a<p +  rb<f> +  tcA)A (18) 
4 <p
—A(2a<t> — rb<p +  tcL)]
which is strictly concave in A if the coefficient of A2 (namely —2a(t>+Tb<j>+rcA) 
is positive and strictly convex if this coefficient is negative. Furthermore, since 
the coefficient of A2 and of A are the same (up to their sign), this expression 
has always an interior extremum at A =  1/2. As a result, the optimal choice 
of the planner is determined by the sign of the coefficient of A2 in (18). The 
critical value of r  arises when the sign of the coefficient of A2 changes, and it 
is given by
r O =  a<ft
b<p +  cA (19)
Hence we have:
Proposition  2 If t  >  t °  , then the symmetric configuration is the first best 
optimum; if r < r °  any agglomerated configurations is an optimum; if r =  r °  
there is a continuum of optima.
As expected, it is socially desirable to agglomerate the modern sector 
into a single region once trade costs are low, increasing returns in the modern 
sector are strong enough and/or the output of the modern sector is differenti­
ated enough.
3 .4  E fficien cy : th e  secon d  b est o u tco m e
We now assume that lump sum transfers are not available to the planner 
who is only able to assign locations to the skilled workers. For example, in 




























































































of permits while, in India, industrial firms were prohibited from locating new 
plants in or close to large cities (World Bank, 1999).
In such a context, the social welfare function is still given by (17) but it 
is evaluated at the equilibrium prices (7)-(10):
Ws =  -
L(b<t> +  cL) 
8</>2(2 b<f> +  cL)2
(A 1A2 +  A 2A + A 3)
where A j =  Lt [(7<?AL +  nbc<t>L +  UbafiA +  24b24>2 -  c2L2)r -3 2 ac<pL -  
48ab</>2], A 2 s  —K\, and A 3 =  2(6ab4>2rA  +  2a2 (p2 A +  2a2<t>2L +  4ac<prAL 
+ c2t2AL2 -  3b2<f>2r 2A). Since A'2 =  — K\, A =  1/2 is always a solution.
The choice of the planner is similar to that described in the first best 
case except that the critical value r  of is now given by the following expression:
_____________I6a<t>(3b<t> + 2 cL)_____________
7c2AL +  12bapL +  l2bc<pA +  24b202 -  c2L2
( 20)
It is readily verified that r Af > 0 implies r5 > 0. Hence we have:
Proposition  3 Assume that (14) holds. If r > ts , then the symmetric config­
uration is the second best optimum; if r  < r s any agglomerated configuration 
is a second best optimum; if r  =  ts there is a continuum of second best optima.
4 Welfare for the skilled and unskilled workers
Consider first the welfare of the skilled which is defined, up to an additive
constant, by:
W i =  A L(Sh +  u>h ) +  (1 — A )L(Sf  +  W f)
evaluated at the equilibrium prices (7)-( 10), that is:
b(p +  cL
WL =  —
8<t>2(2b<p +  cL)2
(A fA 2 +  A fA  + A 3l )
where A f  =  Lr[(2c2AL+12bc0L+86c</>/l+2462</)2- c 2L2)r - 32ac<pL-48ab<p2\, 




























































































A = 1/2 is always a solution. The critical value of r  for which the whole group 
of skilled prefer agglomeration to any other distribution may be obtained as 
in the foregoing:
i  ______________ 16a<ft(3b</> + 2cL)____________
~ 2(?AL  + \2bc<pL +  HbctpA +  24b2<p2 -  c2L2 [
which is clearly strictly larger than rs .
We now come to the welfare of the unskilled which, up to an additive 
constant, is equal to:
Wa - ^ S h +  Sf )
evaluated again at the equilibrium prices (7)-(10):
WA =  -
L(b<p +  cL ) 
802(260 + c i )2
(K [\ 2 + K ”2\ +  k'"3)
where K i =  2cALt2(5cL +  4b<f>), K 2 =  K lt and K 3 =  2A(2ab<f>2r +  6a2(p2 + 
4ac<prL + c2t 2L 2 — b2<p2r 2). Since K\ is always strictly positive, the optimal 
choice for the unskilled workers is always the same in that they prefer the 
dispersed configuration to the agglomerated one.
To sum-up, we have:
Proposition  4 If t >  tl , then the skilled workers prefer the symmetric con­
figuration to any other; if r < r L they prefer the agglomerated configuration 
to any other; if t =  r L they are indifferent. Regardless of the value of r, the 
unskilled prefer the dispersed configuration to any other.
5 Is agglomeration desirable? And for whom?
As seen in Section 3.1, a deepening in the integration of different economies 
is likely to lead to the emergence of a core region accommodating the entire 
modern sector. We now wish to determine (i) whether or not such an agglom­
eration is socially optimal and (ii) which groups of workers are the winners or 




























































































There are several distortions and external effects at work in the present 
model which are likely to lead to significant discrepancy between equilibrium 
and optimum. Besides the standard distortion due to the fact that firms do 
not price at marginal cost, there are pecuniary externalities and, since our 
economy is imperfectly competitive, they matter for the level of welfare. In 
particular, skilled workers impose a pecuniary externality on the workers of the 
traditional sector. Their move affects the intensity of local competition as well 
as the amount spent by the unskilled on trade costs. As seen in Proposition 4, 
the unskilled are always worse off when the skilled agglomerate. In addition, 
when skilled workers move from one region to the other, they do not account 
either for the impact of their migration on the other skilled. Such move affects 
not only the intensity of competition but also the level of demand inside each 
region, and, therefore, their wages. Note, however, that there is no over- or 
under-entry effect. Indeed, the number N  of firms is the same in equilibrium 
and at the optimum since it is determined by the technology and equal to L/<t>.
In order to study the impact of these various effects, we need to rank 
the different threshold values for r  obtained in the previous sections.
5.1 E qu ilib riu m  vs op tim u m
Some simple calculations show that r °  < rs <  r Af when (14) holds. These 
inequalities reveal several important things. First, r °  < ts , namely agglom­
eration is desirable for higher values of the transport cost in the second best. 
This is because the individual demand elasticity is much lower in the first best 
(marginal cost pricing) than in the second best (Nash equilibrium pricing), 
so that regional price indices are less sensitive to a decrease in r. The fall in 
transport costs must be sufficiently large to make the agglomeration of the 
mobile workers socially desirable.
Second, we also have rs < r M. This is because skilled workers do 
not internalize the negative external effects they impose on the unskilled who 
always prefer dispersion as shown by Proposition 4. Hence, even though the 
skilled have incentives to move, these incentives do not reflect the social value 
of their move.
This discrepancy is even stronger when we compare the first best out­
come and the market equilibrium because we have just seen that marginal 




























































































an agglomerated configuration for a whole range ( r °  < r < tm) of trade cost 
values for which it is socially desirable to have a dispersed pattern of activities. 
We can also show that
r M T ° > a<p
btp + cA
so that the size of the range for which equilibrium and optimum differ is 
bounded from below by a value which increases with increasing returns and/or 
the degree of product differentiation in the modern sector. On the other hand, 
when the size of the traditional sector rises this bound decreases.
Accordingly, when transport costs are low (r  < r ° )  or high (r > r w) 
the market yields the optimum so that no regional policy is required from the 
efficiency point of view, although equity considerations might still justify such 
a policy when agglomeration arises. On the contrary, for intermediate values of 
transport costs ( r °  < r  < r M), the market provides excessive agglomeration, 
thus justifying the need for an active regional policy in order to foster the 
dispersion of the modern sector from both the efficiency and equity grounds.
The first best optimum requires the implementation of lump-sum trans­
fers. If such transfers are not feasible while the planner is still able to control 
the locations of the skilled workers, it remains true that, for some values of 
the trade costs ( t s  <  t  <  t m ), the market outcome is agglomeration whereas 
the second best optimum involves dispersion. Nevertheless, the discrepancy is 
less severe than with the first best outcome since the gap tm — r s is narrower 
than r Af — r ° .  Still, in both cases, we have an illustration of what was claimed 
by the European Commission in the quotation made in the introduction.
We can again use the geometrical analysis of 3.2 to understand the bias 
of the decentralized outcome. Starting again from perfect symmetry between 
regions ( nyi =  nFt Q'HH =  Q'FF, and p'HH =  p'FF), Figure 2 shows what 
would happen to the local inverse demands in the two regions were the lo­
cations of firms to change while holding their prices and the price indexes 
constant, that is, while isolating the model from the competition effect. The 
linearity of demand implies that, in terms of both operating profits and con­
sumer surpluses, one region gains what the other loses. This is shown by 
thp identity of the areas of the two shaded rectangles and of the two corre­
sponding triangles above them which stems from the fact that the horizontal 
intercepts of the modified regional demands are symmetric around the initial 




























































































immaterial from an efficiency viewpoint. The crucial source of distortion is 
then the neglect of the competition effect by firms. Since they underestimate 
their positive (negative) impact on the intensity of competition in the region 
of destination (origin) and the competition effect is stronger the larger the 
transport costs, they tend to agglomerate below a threshold value of r  which 
is larger than the efficient ones.1
5.2  A g g lom era tion  and  th e  w elfare o f  sk illed  an d  unskilled
We now want to determine to what extent the cooperative behavior of skilled 
workers in the migration process affects the well-being of the two groups of 
workers evaluated at the equilibrium prices. In this case, the skilled are as­
sumed to act together in order to internalize all the effects that an individual 
mover has on the other skilled. However, they still disregard the impact that 
their decision has on the unskilled. This explains why r L >  ts (as well as 
tl > t° ) ,  as shown in Section 4.
It remains to compare r L and r A/. The ranking is not a priori obvious 
because an individual skilled worker does not internalize the competition, va­
riety and demand effects described in Section 3.1. Some tedious calculations 
show that
ta/ ^  tl ancj onj jj-  ̂ —i. — (22)
J c 4 <p y '
Hence, when the competition effect is weak because c is small, when the 
variety effect is strong because b is large, and/or when the demand effect is 
strong because of the large number <f> of skilled moving with their firm, then 
the market will result in agglomeration although the whole group of skilled 
workers prefers dispersion. Another simple, and perhaps more suggestive, 
way to say that (22) holds is to assume that the population size (L) of the 
skilled/mobile workers is ‘small’ . In this case, a single mover expects more 
than what she obtains when all the ski.led move with her.
Since the unskilled as a whole always prefer dispersion, when (22) holds 
there exists a domain of trade cost values ( r L < r < r M )  for which both 
groups of workers are worse off at the marlet agglomeration than at the dis­
persed configuration. This somewhat surpi i ing result finds its origin in the 7




























































































several pecuniary externalities that a skilled worker imposes on all workers 
when moving from one region to the other.
When (22) does not hold, the skilled remain dispersed although it is 
optimal for them to congregate for r w < r < r L. This is so when there are 
‘many’ skilled/mobile workers in the economy, in which case the two groups 
of workers have conflicting interests. Whereas the skilled would benefit from a 
coordinating device that would lead them to agglomerate, the unskilled would 
be hurt by such a coordination.
6 The lobbying game
We now assume that a central authority (the European Commission) has the 
power to restrict the mobility of the skilled workers but does not have enough 
information to enforce the first and second best optima. Which interest groups 
are going to be formed and how can we expect them to influence the political 
choice between free mobility (denoted by / )  and mobility barriers (denoted 
by b) for the skilled workers? In our setting, there are two natural interest 
groups that can be formed: (i) the skilled who are potentially mobile and (ii) 
the unskilled who are immobile. As seen in the foregoing, the former hurt the 
latter when they agglomerate into a single region.
Following Bernheim and Whinston (1986), we model the political process 
as an auction over alternative policies whose bidders are the interest groups. 
The auctioneer is the central authority which has no information about the 
welfare implications of policies and uses the bid offers to extract information 
about the lobbyists’ valuations of the alternative policies. Hence, this a sig­
nalling game in which the two interest groups make offers, anticipating that 
the central authority will implement the policy that gets the higher bid. For 
simplicity, it is assumed that the first stage game is a game of complete infor­
mation whose outcome is given by a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium. Finally, 
we assume that bidding is ‘competitive’ : both interest groups have free access 
to the bidding process, both face zero cost of collective action and the central 
authority simply acts as a neutral intermediator (‘honest broker’).8
“ In this respect, our framework differs from the common-agency approach developed 
since Grossman and Helpman (1994) who considers situations in which the access to the 
lobbying process is restricted to some interests only and the central authority is not a neutral 




























































































We already know that for r  > t l  both groups of workers are better off 
when there is dispersion. In this case, there is multiplicity of equilibria in which 
one group makes an arbitrarily small but strictly positive offer (when r =  r L 
only the unskilled will make an offer). Regardless of the equilibrium outcome 
that emerges, the chosen policy, that is free mobility or mobility barriers, turns 
out to be socially optimal. When r  < r L, there is always a conflict between 
the two groups because the unskilled do not want the skilled to agglomerate. 
The winning group will be the group which enjoys the higher surplus relative 
to the alternative policy, respectively given by W i ( f )  -  W i(b) for the skilled 
and \VA(b) — WA(f )  for the unskilled, where Wk (s) is the welfare evaluated 
at the equilibrium prices (7)-(10) of the group K  € { L , A}  when the solution 
s e { / ,  6} is chosen. Clearly, in the equilibrium of the lobbying game, only 
the winning group bids and its offer is equal to the surplus of the other group. 
Hence, we have to determine under which conditions we have
WL(f )  ~ WL(b) >  (< )W A(b) -  WA( f )
These inequalities are equivalent to
WL{} )  +  WA(f )  > (< )W L(b) +  WA(b) (23)
which corresponds to the second best condition. As a consequence, it follows 
from Proposition 3 that the group of skilled will win the auction when r  < t s . 
On the other hand, when rs  < t  < r l , the auction will be won by the group of 
unskilled. In other words, in our model competitive lobbying leads to the second 
best optimum.* This implies that a deepening of the integration process will 
favor the freeness of the skilled once trade costs have reached a value which is 
below r s . Stated differently, moving toward sufficiently far in the direction of 
free trade is accompanied by a political process that spurs the mobility of the 
skilled workers and the formation of a core region.
Thus far, we have assumed that both groups of workers are organized 
on an interregional basis. This seems reasonable for the mobile workers but 
is less for the immobile. Allowing for cooperation between the skilled and 
the unskilled who reside in the region that becomes the core region does not
9 Clearly, any violation of the competitive’ assumption would lead to suboptimal policy 
choices This would happen, for example, if (i) not all skilled or unskilled workers were 
members of their corresponding interest group, since different weights would be introduced 
in the above inequalities, (ii) if different interest groups faced different costs of collective 




























































































affect our results, however. Indeed, if H is the elected region, we have to 
compare W i ( f )  — Wi(b)  +  ( } )  — \V^(b), the differential surplus earned
by the skilled and the subgroup formed by the unskilled living in region H, to 
W%(b) — W%(f)  which represents the differential surplus of the unskilled in 
region F. Even if the values of the bids are not the same as before, the policy 
choice is still the same since the inequalities
w L(f) -  WL(b) + W%U) -  W%(b) > « ) < ( & )  -  W fU )
are again equivalent to (23). Of course, the whole burden of agglomeration 
is now on the shoulders of the traditional workers living in the peripheral 
region. Therefore, cooperation between the skilled and some unskilled has 
strong redistributive implications within the population of unskilled workers. 
More generally, this implies that, while the actual coalitions that are formed 
are crucial in terms of redistribution, they turn out to be immaterial in terms 
of efficiency.
7 Concluding remarks
Our model of agglomeration has allowed us to investigate the much debated 
question of whether or not the deepening of the integration process within the 
EU is going to lead to more concentration of economic activities, and when 
such an agglomeration is desirable from the collective standpoint. Our results 
suggest that there is no clear-cut answer. Indeed, too much agglomeration 
arises for intermediate values of the trade costs, while the market outcome is 
optimal for low or high values of these costs. However, there seems to be a need 
for an active regional policy within the EU if, as discussed in the introduction, 
the actual values of trade costs are not likely to become very low. This raises 
the question of the implementation of the desirable policy.
We concentrated here on imposing restrictions on factor mobility as a 
policy instrument to prevent undesired agglomeration. Assuming that the 
central authority has little or poor information about the welfare implications 
of alternatives decision, we have shown that, if interest groups are allowed to 
reveal their preferences through competitive lobbying, the political outcome 
may well foster a solution which is efficient. For such a mechanism to work, 




























































































same cost of collective action and the central authority should simply act as 
a neutral intermediator.
In perspective, our analysis also yields potentially interesting insights on 
the issue of interregional transfers. First, the model suggests the existence of 
an upper bound on the amount of redistribution that could be performed with­
out distorting efficiency. This level is equal to half of the difference between 
the relative surpluses attained by the winning and losing interest groups. Sec­
ond, while, for simplicity, we have restricted our attention to factor mobility 
controls so that the potential scope of transfers is merely redistributive, in­
spired by the European experience one might wonder whether similar results 
could be attained by using only transfers also for shaping the efficient economic 
landscape. This should be possible in principle whenever equity and efficiency 
go hand in hand (no equity-efficiency trade-off). However, under both counts, 
the lack of information by the central authority would require some sort of 
more sophisticated mechanism design than our simple menu auction.
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Figure 2: Demand effects































































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the 
European University Institute, Florence
Copies can be obtained free o f charge 
-  depending on the availability o f stocks -  from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy



























































































Publications o f the European University Institute
To The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) -  Italy 





□  Please send me a complete list o f EUI Working Papers
□  Please send me a complete list o f EUI book publications
□  Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 1999/2000





































































































W o r k in g  P a p e rs  o f  the D ep a rtm en t o f  E c o n o m ic s  
P u b lish e d  s in ce  1998
ECO No. 98/1 
Bauke V1SSER
Binary Decision Structures and the 




Fiscal Solvency and Fiscal Forecasting in 
Europe
ECO No. 98/3
Giampiero M. GALLO/Barbara PACINI 
Early News is Good News: The Effects 
of Market Opening on Market Volatility
ECO No. 98/4
Michael J. ARTIS/Zenon G.
KONTOLEMIS
Inflation Targeting and the European 
Central Bank
ECO No. 98/5 
Alexandre KOLEV
The Distribution of Enterprise Benefits in 
Russia and their Impact on Individuals' 
Well-Being
ECO No. 98/6 
Kitty STEWART
Financing Education at the Local Level: A 
Study of the Russian Region of 
Novgorod
ECO No. 98/7 
Anna PETTINI/Louis PHLIPS 





More Equal but Less Mobile? Education
Financing and Intergenerational Mobility
in Italy and in the US
ECO No. 98/9 
Andrea ICHINO/Pietro ICHINO 
Discrimination or Individual Effort? 





The Long-Run Educational Cost of World 
War II. An Example of Local Average 
Treatment Effect Estimation
ECO No. 98/11 
Luca FLAB BI/Andrea ICHINO 
Productivity, Seniority and Wages. New 
Evidence from Personnel Data
ECO No. 98/12
Jian-Ming ZHOU
Is Nominal Public but De Facto Private 
Land Ownership Appropriate? A 
Comparative Study amonp Cambodia, 
Laos, Vietnam; Japan, Taiwan Province 
of China, South Korea; China, Myanmar; 
and North Korea
ECO No. 98/13 
Anna PE111NI




RAJ AH/Arthur VAN SOEST
School Quality, Exam Performance, and
Career Choice
ECO No. 98/15 
Ramon MARIMON/Juan Pablo 
NICOLINI/Pedro TELES 









Why Did Earnings Inequality Increase in
Ireland: 1987-1994?
ECO No. 98/18 
Luis A. GIL-ALANA 






























































































Luis A. GIL-ALANA 
Multivariate Tests of Fractionally 
Integrated Hypotheses
ECO No. 98/20 
Luis A. GIL-ALANA/
P.M. ROBINSON
Testing of Seasonal Fractional Integration 




Nelson and Plosser Revisited: Evidence
from Fractional AR1MA Models
ECO No. 98/22 
Alexander GUMBEL 
Herding in Delegated Portfolio 
Management: When is Comparative 
Performance Information Desirable?
ECO No. 98/23 
Giuseppe BERTOLA 
Microeconomic Perspectives on 
Aggregate Labor Markets
ECO No. 98/24 
Anindya BANERJEE/Stepana 
LAZAROVA/Giovanni URGA 
Bootstrapping Sequential Tests for 
Multiple Structural Breaks
ECO No. 98/25
Anindya BANERJEE/Giovanni URGA 
Sequential Methods for Detecting 
Structural Breaks in Cointegrated 
Systems
ECO No. 98/26 
Anindya BANERJEE/Lynne 
COCKERELL/Bill RUSSELL 
An 1(2) Analysis of Inflation and the 
Markup
ECO No. 98/27 
Alan BEGGS/
Anindya BANERJEE 
Simultaneous Versus Sequential Move 
Structures in Principal-Agent Models
ECO No. 98/28 
Michael EHRMANN 
Will EMU Generate Asymmetry? 
Comparing Monetary Policy 




Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and 
Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic 
Games
ECO No. 98/30 
Mathias HOFFMANN 
Long Run Capital Flows and the 
Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle: A New 
Measure of International Capital Mobility 
and Some Historical Evidence from Great 
Britain and the United States
ECO No. 98/31 
Oliver KIRCHKAMP 
Simultaneous Evolution of Learning 
Rules and Strategies
ECO No. 98/32
Ramon MARIMON/Fabrizio ZILIBOTTI 
Unemployment vs. Mismatch of Talents: 
Reconsidering Unemployment Benfits
ECO No. 98/33
Giorgia GIOVANNfcl l l/Ramon
MARIMON
An EMU with Different Transmission 
Machanisms?
ECO No. 98/34
Marcello D’AMATO/Barbara PISTORESI 
Delegation of a Monetary Policy to a 
Central Banker with Private Information
ECO No. 98/35 
Leonardo BARTOLINI/Giuseppe 
BERTOLA/Alessandro PRAT1 
Day-To-Day Monetary Policy and the 
Volatility of the Federal Funds Interest 
Rate
ECO No. 98/36 
Matthias BRUECKNER 
Voting on Policies in Committees: A 
Welfare Analysis
ECO No. 98/37
Albert MARCET/Ramon MARIMON 
Recursive Contracts
ECO No. 98/38
Etienne BILLETTE de VILLEMEUR 





























































































ECO No. 98/39 
Giuseppe BERTOLA 








How to Carry Out Land Consolidation - 
An International Comparison
ECO No. 99/2 
Nuala O’DONNELL
Industry Earnings Differentials in Ireland: 
1987-1994
ECO No. 99/3 
Ray BARRELL/Rebecca RILEY 
Equilibrium Unemployment and Labour 
Market Flows in the UK
ECO No. 99/4 
Klaus ADAM
Learning while Searching for the Best 
Alternative
ECO No. 99/5
Guido ASCARI/Juan Angel GARCIA 
Relative Wage Concern and the 
Keynesian Contract Multiplier
ECO No. 99/6
Guido ASCARI/Juan Angel GARCIA 
Price/Wage Staggering and Persistence
ECO No. 99/7 
Elena GENNARI
Estimating Money Demand in Italy: 
1970-1994
ECO No. 99/8
Marcello D’AMATO/Barbara PISTORESI 
Interest Rate Spreads Between Italy and 
Germany: 1995-1997
ECO No. 99/9 
Spren JOHANSEN
A Small Sample Correction for Tests of 
Hypotheses on the Cointegrating Vectors
ECO No. 99/10 
Sflren JOHANSEN





Career Choices of German High School
Graduates: Evidence from the German
Socio-Economic Panel
ECO No. 99/12 
Fragiskos ARCHONTAKIS 
Jordan Matrices on the Equivalence of the 
/  (1) Conditions for VAR Systems
ECO No. 99/13
Etienne BILLETTE de VILLEMEUR 
Sequential Decision Processes Make 
Behavioural Types Endogenous
ECO No. 99/14 
Gunther REHME
Public Policies and Education, Economic 
Growth and Income Distribution
ECO No. 99/15 
Pierpaolo BA1T1GALLI/
Marciano SINISCALCHI
Interactive Beliefs and Forward Induction
ECO No. 99/16
Marco FUGAZZA
Search Subsidies vs Hiring Subsidies:
A General Equilibrium Analysis of 
Employment Vouchers
ECO No. 99/17 
Pierpaolo BATTIGALLI 
Rationalizability in Incomplete 
Information Games
ECO No. 99/18 




Ramon MARIMON/Fabrizio ZILIBOTTI 
Employment and Distributional Effects of 
Restricting Working Time
ECO No. 99/20 
Leonor COUTINHO 
Euro Exchange Rates: What Can Be 
Expected in Terms'of Volatility?




























































































=5 E C O  No, 99/21
O  Bernard RNGLETON
XX, \Efconomic Geography with Spatial
Econometrics: A ‘Third Way' to Analyse 
Economic Development and 
‘Equilibrium’ , with Application to the EU 
Regions
E C O  99/22 
Mike ARTIS/
Massimiliano MARCELLINO 
Fiscal Forecasting: The Track Record of 
the IMF, OECD and EC
E C O  99/23
Massimo MOTTA/Michele POLO 
Leniency Programs and Cartel 
Prosecution
E C O  99/24
Mike ARTIS/Hans-Martin KROLZIG/ 
Juan TORO
The European Business Cycle
E C O  99/25 
Mathias HOFFMANN 
Current Accounts and the Persistence of 
Global and Country-Specific Shocks: Is 
Investment Really too Volatile?
E C O  99/26 
Mathias HOFFMANN 
National Stochastic Trends and 
International Macroeconomic 
Fluctuations: The Role of the Current 
Account
E C O  99/27
Gianmarco l.P. OTTAVIANO/ 
Jacques-François THISSE 
Integration, Agglomeration and the 
Political Economics of Factor Mobility
♦out of print
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
